Öz
Bu makalede bireylerin eylemlerine müdahale etmenin tek haklı gerekçesinin başkalarına zarar gelmesini önlemek olduğunu ifade eden ‘‘zarar ilkesine (Zİ)’’ getirilen üç eleştiriyi tartıştım. Öncelikle ilkeyi anlamlı kılabilecek bir zarar tarifinin bulunmadığı eleştirisini ele alarak bu eleştirinin, ilkenin ancak problemsiz bir zarar tanımı ile birlikte makul kabul edilebileceği varsayımına dayandığını tespit ettim. Zarar kavramına ilişkin var olan bilgi dağarcığımızı görmezden gelmesi ve zarara başvuran ilkeler haricindeki diğer birçok ilkeyi de kapsayan genel bir şüpheciliğin önünü açması nedeniyle ilgili varsayımı reddetmemiz gerektiğini savundum. İkinci olarak, zarar vermenin yanlışlığının halihazırda yaygın olarak kabul ediliyor olmasından ötürü Zİ’nin bize yeni bir şey söylemediği, zararın türü/miktarı gibi güncel tartışmaların yoğunlaştığı noktalarda suskun kaldığı ve dolayısıyla artık işlevsiz olduğu eleştirisini değerlendirdim. Buna karşın hangi zarar tarifinin benimsendiğinden bağımsız olarak Zİ’nin, zararın varlığı kanıtlanmadıkça bireylerin eylemlerinde serbest bırakılmaları gerektiğini vurgulayan bir özgürlük karinesini temsil etme ve bazı eylemlerin zarar içermese dahi yasaklanabileceğini düşünen hukuki ahlakçılara yasak taleplerini gerekçelendirme yükümlülüklerini hatırlatma şeklinde iki önemli işleve halen sahip olduğunu iddia ettim. Son olarak Zİ'nin potansiyel kötüye kullanımlarına dair endişelere değindim. Bu endişelerin giderilmesi için yapılması gerekenin, zarar içeren eylemleri belirlemeye çalışmak değil, her eylemin bir miktar zarar içerme olasılığına sahip olduğunu kabul ederek hangi tür zararların hukuken düzenlenmesi gerektiği özelinde makul bir seçenek ortaya koymak olduğunu iddia ettim. Zİ’nin suiistimallerinin genellikle zarar kavramının geniş yorumlanmasının ürünü olduğunu düşünerek, cebir ve hile eylemlerinin neden olduğu birinci derece zararları esas alan, hukuki öngörülebilirliği artıracak bir hukuki çerçeve benimsemeyi tercih ettim. Kuşkusuz bu tercih yasaklanması gereken bazı zararlı eylemlere karşı hukuki koruma sağlayamama riskini içermektedir; ancak bu, özgürlüğü korumayı taahhüt eden genel bir ilke ortaya koymak için ödenmesi gereken bir bedeldir. Buradan hareketle, ele aldığım üç eleştiriden hiçbirinin Zİ’nin reddedilmesini gerektirmediği sonucuna vardım.
Anahtar Kelimeler
John Stuart Mill Zarar Zarar İlkesi Hukuki Liberalizm Zarar İlkesine Yönelik Eleştiriler.
Kaynakça
- Archard, D. (1990) Freedom Not to be Free: The Case of the Slavery Contract in J. S. Mill’s On Liberty. Philosophical Quarterly 40: 453-465.
- Boonin, D. (2014). The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bradley, B. (2012). Doing Away with Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 85(2), 390–412.
- Brown, D. G. (2010). Mill on the Harm in Not Voting, Utilitas, 22: 126–33.
- Cane, P. (2006). Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate. The Journal of Ethics, 10(1/2), 21–51.
- Devlin, P. (1965). The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Duff, R. A. (2016). Legal Moralism and Public Wrongs. Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore (ed. Ferzan K. & Morse S., pp. 95-110). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dülger, M. (2020). John Stuart Mill ve Hukuk Kuramına Etkileri. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy. 10 (4), 1471-1493.
- Epstein, R. A. (1995). The Harm Principle- And How It Grew. The University of Toronto Law Journal, 45(4), 369–417.
- Feinberg, J. (1984). Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Feinberg, J. (1985). Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Folland, A. (2022). The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm. Utilitas, 34(2), 139-153.
- George, R. P. (1993). Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
- George, R. P. (2001). The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books.
- Hanser, M. (2008). The Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77: 421–50.
- Hanser, M. (2013). Harm. International Encyclopedia of Ethics (ed. H. LaFollette, pp. 2299–2307). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- Harcourt, B. E. (1999). The Collapse of the Harm Principle. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), 90(1), 109–194.
- Harman, E. (2009). Harming as Causing Harm. Harming Future Persons (ed. M. A. Roberts ve D. T. Wasserman, pp. 137-154). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Hart, H. L. A. (1963). Law, Liberty and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, H. L. A. (1965). The Morality of the Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, H. L. A. (2011). Hukuk, Özgürlük ve Ahlak (çev. E. Öz). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi.
- Holtug, N. (2002). The Harm Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5: 357–89.
- Jonas, M. (2016). Assessing Baselines for Identifying Harm: Tricky Cases and Childhood. Res Publica. 22: 387–404.
- Mill, J.S. (2019). Özgürlük Üzerine (çev. B. Tartıcı). İstanbul: Kutu Yayınları.
- Moore, M. S. (1997). Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Murphy, J.G. (2007). Legal moralism and retribution revisited. Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, 5–20.
- New, B. (1999) Paternalism and Public Policy. Economics and Philosophy 15: 63-83.
- Peršak, N. (2007). Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, its Limits and Continental Counterparts. New York: Springer.
- Petersen, T. S. (2014). Being Worse Off: But in Comparison with What? On the Baseline Problem of Harm and the Harm Principle. Res Publica. 20: 199–214.
- Rand, A. (1964). The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New York: Penguin.
- Saunders, B. (2016). Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle. Mind, 125(500), 1005–1032.
- Shafer-Landau, R. (2021). The Fundamentals of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shiffrin, S. S. (1999). Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm. Legal Theory, 5: 117–48.
- Smith, S. D. (2004). The Hollowness of the Harm Principle. University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. 17.
- Stephen, J. F. (1991). Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: And Three Brief Essays. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Szerletics, A. (2015). Paternalism: Moral Theory and Legal Practice. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Tadros, V. (2016). Wrongs and Crimes. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Uzun, E. (2015). Ahlaksızlığın Cezalandırılması: Hart-Devlin Tartışması. H. L. A. Hart ve Hukuk-Ahlak Ayrımı. (ed. S. Gürler, ss. 65-99). İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.
- Westmoreland, R. (2020). The Liberty of the Liberty Principle. Res Publica 26 (3): 337-355.
- Zhou, Y. K. (2022). What it means to suffer harm. Jurisprudence. 13:4, 516-544.
Öz
In this article, I discuss three criticisms of ‘‘the harm principle (HP)’’, which states that the only justification for interfering with individual’s actions is to prevent harm to others. First, I address the criticism that there is no definition of harm that can make the principle reasonable, and I find that this criticism is based on the assumption that the principle can only be considered reasonable with an unproblematic definition of harm. I argue that we should reject this assumption because it ignores our existing knowledge of the concept of harm and opens the way for a general skepticism that extends to many principles other than those addressing harm. Secondly, I consider the criticism that, since the wrongfulness of causing harm is already widely accepted, the principle tells us nothing new, is silent on the points where current debates intensify, such as the type/amount of harm, and is therefore no longer functional. On the other hand, I argue that, regardless of the definition of harm adopted, the HP still serves two important functions: Representing a presumption of liberty that emphasizes that individuals should be free to act unless the existence of harm is proven, and reminding legal moralists who believe that some acts can be prohibited even if they do not involve harm of their obligation to justify such prohibitions. Finally, I address concerns about potential abuses of the HP. I argue that what is needed to address these concerns is not to try to identify acts that involve harm, but to recognize that every act has the potential to involve some level of harm, and to make a reasonable choice as to which types of harm should be regulated by law. Considering that abuse of HP often arises from a broad interpretation of the concept of harm, I prefer to adopt a legal framework that would increase legal predictability, based on the first-degree harms caused by acts of force and fraud. Undoubtedly, this choice entails the risk of failing to provide legal protection against certain harmful acts that should be prohibited, but this is a price that must be paid for a general principle that is committed to protecting liberty. Thus, I conclude that none of the three criticisms I discussed require the rejection of HP.
Anahtar Kelimeler
John Stuart Mill Harm Harm Principle Legal Liberalism Criticisms Of The Harm Principle.
Kaynakça
- Archard, D. (1990) Freedom Not to be Free: The Case of the Slavery Contract in J. S. Mill’s On Liberty. Philosophical Quarterly 40: 453-465.
- Boonin, D. (2014). The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bradley, B. (2012). Doing Away with Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 85(2), 390–412.
- Brown, D. G. (2010). Mill on the Harm in Not Voting, Utilitas, 22: 126–33.
- Cane, P. (2006). Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate. The Journal of Ethics, 10(1/2), 21–51.
- Devlin, P. (1965). The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Duff, R. A. (2016). Legal Moralism and Public Wrongs. Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore (ed. Ferzan K. & Morse S., pp. 95-110). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dülger, M. (2020). John Stuart Mill ve Hukuk Kuramına Etkileri. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy. 10 (4), 1471-1493.
- Epstein, R. A. (1995). The Harm Principle- And How It Grew. The University of Toronto Law Journal, 45(4), 369–417.
- Feinberg, J. (1984). Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Feinberg, J. (1985). Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Folland, A. (2022). The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm. Utilitas, 34(2), 139-153.
- George, R. P. (1993). Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
- George, R. P. (2001). The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books.
- Hanser, M. (2008). The Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77: 421–50.
- Hanser, M. (2013). Harm. International Encyclopedia of Ethics (ed. H. LaFollette, pp. 2299–2307). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- Harcourt, B. E. (1999). The Collapse of the Harm Principle. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), 90(1), 109–194.
- Harman, E. (2009). Harming as Causing Harm. Harming Future Persons (ed. M. A. Roberts ve D. T. Wasserman, pp. 137-154). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Hart, H. L. A. (1963). Law, Liberty and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, H. L. A. (1965). The Morality of the Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, H. L. A. (2011). Hukuk, Özgürlük ve Ahlak (çev. E. Öz). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi.
- Holtug, N. (2002). The Harm Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5: 357–89.
- Jonas, M. (2016). Assessing Baselines for Identifying Harm: Tricky Cases and Childhood. Res Publica. 22: 387–404.
- Mill, J.S. (2019). Özgürlük Üzerine (çev. B. Tartıcı). İstanbul: Kutu Yayınları.
- Moore, M. S. (1997). Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Murphy, J.G. (2007). Legal moralism and retribution revisited. Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, 5–20.
- New, B. (1999) Paternalism and Public Policy. Economics and Philosophy 15: 63-83.
- Peršak, N. (2007). Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, its Limits and Continental Counterparts. New York: Springer.
- Petersen, T. S. (2014). Being Worse Off: But in Comparison with What? On the Baseline Problem of Harm and the Harm Principle. Res Publica. 20: 199–214.
- Rand, A. (1964). The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New York: Penguin.
- Saunders, B. (2016). Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle. Mind, 125(500), 1005–1032.
- Shafer-Landau, R. (2021). The Fundamentals of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shiffrin, S. S. (1999). Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm. Legal Theory, 5: 117–48.
- Smith, S. D. (2004). The Hollowness of the Harm Principle. University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. 17.
- Stephen, J. F. (1991). Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: And Three Brief Essays. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Szerletics, A. (2015). Paternalism: Moral Theory and Legal Practice. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Tadros, V. (2016). Wrongs and Crimes. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Uzun, E. (2015). Ahlaksızlığın Cezalandırılması: Hart-Devlin Tartışması. H. L. A. Hart ve Hukuk-Ahlak Ayrımı. (ed. S. Gürler, ss. 65-99). İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.
- Westmoreland, R. (2020). The Liberty of the Liberty Principle. Res Publica 26 (3): 337-355.
- Zhou, Y. K. (2022). What it means to suffer harm. Jurisprudence. 13:4, 516-544.
Ayrıntılar
| Birincil Dil | Türkçe |
|---|---|
| Konular | Sistematik Felsefe (Diğer) |
| Bölüm | Araştırma Makalesi |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 20 Mart 2024 |
| Gönderilme Tarihi | 6 Aralık 2023 |
| Kabul Tarihi | 6 Şubat 2024 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2024 Cilt: 23 Sayı: 1 |
Kaynak Göster
e-ISSN: 2645-8950