BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster

Matching with Restricted Preferences

Yıl 2009, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 10, - , 01.12.2009

Mustafa Doğan

Öz

This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Anahtar Kelimeler

-

Kaynakça

  • Balinski, M. and T. Sonmez (1999), “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement”, Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73–94.
  • Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9–15.
  • Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayar (1990), Two–Sided Matching: A Study in Game–Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
  • Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (1992), “Two Sided Matching,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, (eds.) Aumann R. and S. Hart, North Holland: Elsevier, 485–541.

Matching with Restricted Preferences

Yıl 2009, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 10, - , 01.12.2009

Mustafa Doğan

Öz

This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Anahtar Kelimeler

-

Kaynakça

  • Balinski, M. and T. Sonmez (1999), “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement”, Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73–94.
  • Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9–15.
  • Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayar (1990), Two–Sided Matching: A Study in Game–Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
  • Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (1992), “Two Sided Matching,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, (eds.) Aumann R. and S. Hart, North Holland: Elsevier, 485–541.
Toplam 4 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Mustafa Doğan

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Aralık 2009
Gönderilme Tarihi 12 Aralık 2014
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2009 Cilt: 10 Sayı: 10

Kaynak Göster

APA Doğan, M. (2009). Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi, 10(10). https://doi.org/10.17233/se.45378
AMA Doğan M. Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi. Ekim 2009;10(10). doi:10.17233/se.45378
Chicago Doğan, Mustafa. “Matching With Restricted Preferences”. Sosyoekonomi 10, sy. 10 (Ekim 2009). https://doi.org/10.17233/se.45378.
EndNote Doğan M (01 Ekim 2009) Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi 10 10
IEEE M. Doğan, “Matching with Restricted Preferences”, Sosyoekonomi, c. 10, sy. 10, 2009, doi: 10.17233/se.45378.
ISNAD Doğan, Mustafa. “Matching With Restricted Preferences”. Sosyoekonomi 10/10 (Ekim 2009). https://doi.org/10.17233/se.45378.
JAMA Doğan M. Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi. 2009;10. doi:10.17233/se.45378.
MLA Doğan, Mustafa. “Matching With Restricted Preferences”. Sosyoekonomi, c. 10, sy. 10, 2009, doi:10.17233/se.45378.
Vancouver Doğan M. Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi. 2009;10(10).
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